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ARREST-ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE-OFFICER'S RIGHT" TO KIL.-PIRIE V.
CARTWRIGHT, 70 S. W. 297 (Ky.).-Hcld, that an officer was not justified in
killing a man fleeing to escape arrest for an offense less than felony, although
the officer had reasonable grounds for believing that a felony had been
committed.
Where in fact a felony has not been committed an officer as well as a
private person acts at his peril. State v. Rutherford, 9 Am. Dec. 638; Carr
v. State. 43 Ark. 99; Lacy v. State, 7 Tex. App. 403. The rule is laid down
otherwise in State v. Evans, 16I Mo. 95, but the statement was obiter dictum.
See also, State v. Underwood, 75 Mo. 230; Conraddy v. People, 5 Parker
(N. Y.) 234.
BANKRUPTcY-No JURISDICTION TO ADJUDGE LUNATIC A BANKRUPT.-IN
RE JOSEPH EISENBERG, 8 AM. B. R. 55i.-Held, that the court has not juris-
diction to entertain the petition of a lunatic, filed by his committee, to be
adjudicated a bankrupt.
This question is apparently a novel one, no controlling authorities being
found. The weight of authority holds that an insane ierson may be ad-
judged a bankrupt in involuntary proceedings; In re Pratt, 6 B. R. 276;
Collier, Bankruptcy, 53, and cases cited; even in opposition to wishes of
guardian, In re Weitzel, 14 B. R. 466. But this is so only when acts of
bankruptcy were committed while sane. In re Marvin, Fed. Cas. No; 9178.
In that case, Dillon, J, says: "As to whether an insane person may on
petition of himself or guardian go into voluntary proceedings, the court
gives no opinion." But the requirement in that case, where acts of bankruptcy
had been committed while insane, of the consent of guardian to involuntary
proceedings. intimates that the Bankruptcy Act could be invoked in favor
of an insane person. Such is the ruling in the English cases. In re lames,
12 Q. B. D. 332; In rc Lee, 23 Ch. Div. 216. In 3 Parsons, Contracts 461,
it is stated that an insane person can take advantage of the bankruptcy law,
but no authorities are cited. That a lunatic could take out a petition in a
lucid interval, see Saunders v. Mitchell, 61 Miss. 321.
BANKRUPTCY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-USE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
BOOKS TAKEN By RECEIVER.-PEOPLE V. SIVARTS AND GREENBERG. 8 Am,. B. R.
487 (CRIM. CT. ILL.).-Held, that books and papers, taken possession of
by a receiver, appointed by a bankruptcy court, cannot be used in a criminal
prosecution against the president and director of a corporation, from whose
possession or control they were taken.
This decision is not based on the provision of the Bankruptcy Act.
section 7. that "no testimony given by him (the bankrupt) shall be offered
in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding." but on the constitutional
provisions against compelling a witness to testify against himself. The
weight of authority holds such use of writings forcibly taken possession of
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to be within the constitutional prohibition. Boyd v. U. S., 1i6 U. S. 616;
U. S. v. James, 26 L. R. A. 418. So also even when the books are volun-
tarily given to the receiver for a special purpose. Blum v. State, 5i Atl. 26.
But the seizure to be within the prohibition must amount to evidence in
itself. State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290. In support of the decision that
the protection would extend to the president and director, see 4 Thompson,
Corp. 3447, 349i. Following the reasoning.of the courts in construing the
analogous constitutional provisions, it would seem that this decision might
have been based on the exemption in the Bankruptcy Act, quoted above.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547; Boyd v. U. S., i6 U. S. 6x6.
BANKRUPTCY-CORPORATION CONDUCTING A LAUNDY.-IN RE WHITE STAR
LAUNDRY Co., 9 AM. B. R. 30 (Wis.).-A corporation whose sole business-
is that of operating and conducting a laundry is not a manufacturing, trading
or mercantile corporation, within the meaning of sec. 4b of the 1898 Bank-
ruptcy Act.
The act of i898 is much more limited in its application to corporations
than the act of 1867. The latter act was declared to apply "to all moneyed,
business, or commercial corporations and joint stock companies." Sec. 5122
Rev. St. The present act is restricted to "corporations engaged principally
in manufacturing, trading or mercantile pursuits." For a discussion of
what pursuits come within the language of the act, and a citation of cases,
see XII Yale Law Jour. i68.
BANKRUPTCY-PARTNERSHIP--WHEN CREDITORS MAY SHARE IN INDIVID-
UAL EsTATE.-IN RE GREEN, 8 Am. B. R. 553.-After a partnership had been
dissolved and the business settled up, a former partner became bankrupt.
Held, that section 5f of the Bankruptcy Act, providing for the priority of
individual over partnership claims against individual assets, does not define
the rule to be followed.
This decision is directly contrary to In re Wilcox, 94 Fed. 84, the only
other case on this point under the present act. The latter decision held
that the exception to the equity rule of marshalling the assets, viz., when
there are no firm assets and no solvent partner, being omitted from the act, is
inapplicable. In support of this view, which is based on an exhaustive con-
sideration of the cases and the equities involved, see In re Marwick, Fed.
Cas. No. 9181; Meyer v. Thornburgh, 15 Ind. 124; Potters Works v. Minot,
io Cush. 592. The weight of authority, however, seems to support the
present decision. In re Downing, Fed. Cas. No. 4o44, held that the analogous
section (36) of the act of 1867, applied only when there were firm and
separate assets. So also In re Knight, Fed. Cas. No. 7880; Amsinck v. Bean,
22 Wall. 395; but contra, In re Litchfield, 5 Fed. 47, which held, however.
that the equity exception also applied. The present decision is in line
with those of most of the States. Smith v. Mallory's Ex'r., 24 Ala. 628;
Davis v. Howell, 33 N. 3. Eq. 72; Ramsey v. Nance, 54 Ill. 29.
BANKRUPTcY-DISCHARGE-GROUNDS FOR DENIAL.-IN RE BLALOCK, 118
FED. 679.-A petitioner in bankruptcy had made a false oath in a previous
proceeding in bankruptcy. Held, that this was not sufficient ground for a
denial of discharge.
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Sec. 29, Bankruptcy Act, makes a false oath in any proceeding 
in
bankruptcy a prison offense, and sec. 14 directs a refusal to discharge 
in such
a case. This case decides that "any proceeding" does not 
refer to a previous
distinct proceeding in which the petitioner has been 
guilty of misconduct,
but only to previous proceedings on the same petition. It 
seems to be the
first adjudication directly on the point. The cases cited, 
In re Marx, 1o2
Fed. 676, and In re Logan, io2 Fed. 876, aie not in point 
as to a previous
proceeding and are flatly combatted by In re Gaylord, I2 
Fed. 668.
CONTRACTs-CoERTURE-LEx Loci CoNTRAcTUS-LEx Fo-i.-FIRsT 
NAT.
BANK OF GENEVA, OHIO, V. SHAW ET AL., 70 S. W. 
807 (TENN.).-Held, that
coverture is a defense to an action on a contract though 
the contract was
valid in the State where made.
It is a general rule that a contract valid by the lex loci 
contractus is
valid everywhere;Story, Confi. Laws, sec. 1o3; Nixon v. 
Halley, 78 Ill. 611;
and through comity States generally support such contracts, 
although invalid
by the lex fori, even against those domiciled within them. 
Milliken v.
Pratt, 125 Mass. 374; Wright v. Remington, 41 N. J. L. 
48. In Bond v.
Cummitgs, 70 Me. 125, the law of a foreign country 
prevailed over the State
law against a citizen. Some States, however, follow the lex 
fori, where
parties are domiciled within them. Arnstrong v. Best, 
112 N. C. 50; f ayden
v. Stone, 13 R. I. io6.
CONTRACTs-VALIDITY-PUBLIC POLicY.-BoNTA v. GRIDLEY ET 
AL., 78
N. Y. Supr. 9 6i.-Held, a contract between shareholders 
in a bank and
a third party that he should be elected cashier and continued in 
that capacity
for five years, is not void in absence of evidence of bad faith. 
Davy and
Williams, J J., dissenting.
By the great weight of authority, such contracts as this are 
void as
against public policy. In Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 5O, it was held 
that
an agreement of a shareholder to secure the treasurership of a corporation
for a third party was void in the absence of evidence that the transaction was
not for a private benefit of the shareholder, or that it was consented to by
the other shareholders. So a contract of the president of a bank to make 
one
cashier was held void in Noel v. Drake, 28 Kan. 265. A fortiori, an agreement
by a director to keep another in office is void, even though there is no direct
gain to promisor. West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507. The rule is that any
agreement of a director by which his official action would be influenced or
controlled is dishonest and illegal. Moraw, Corp., sec. 519. But where the
contracting shareholder owned or represented all the shares, his contract
with a third party to induce the latter to become a director was valid. Almy v.
Orne, 165 Mass. 126.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHT OF CONTRACT-SALE OF STOCKS ON 
MARGIN.
-OTIs ET AL. V. PARKER, 23 Sup. CT. REP. I68.-Held, Cal. Const. art. 4, sec.
26, avoiding all contracts for sale of stocks on margin is not an uncon-
stitutional interference with the right of contract, afthough applicable io
bona fde as well as gambling contracts. Brewer and Peckham, J J., dis-
senting.
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In regard to transactions on margins, courts have generally held that
where both parties intend that the commodity dealt in shall not be delivered
and that there shall be merely a settlement of differences, such transactions
are void,-as against statute or at common law. Universal Exchange v.
Strachan, [1896] A. C. i66; Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219; Morris v.
Norton's Adm'x., 43 U. S. App. 739. But they are valid where there are
real purchases and sales; Peters v. Grim, 149 Pa. 163; Hatch v. Douglas,
48 Conn. 116; even though the principal did not intend that his broker should
make actual purchase. Lehman v'. Field, 37 Fed. 852. But recently, upon
the view that "gambling in futures" is seriously prejudical to public welfare,
there has been legislation declaring illegal all transactions on margins,
bona fide or otherwise. Unless such legislation is, under the guise of a
protection of public morals, a clear, unmistakable infringement of funda-
mental rights, it will be supported. Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425.
CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTIONS-VIEWS OF JUDGE.-STATE V. BARRY, 92
N. W. 809 (N. DAK.).-Held, that a charge giving a clear expression of
opinion on the evidence is ground for a new trial.
Belcher v. Prittie, 4 Moore & Scott 275, and Davidson v. Stanley, 3
Scott N. R. 49, allow the English judges wide latitude. A wrong observa-
tion by the judge on a question of fact was 'held in Taylor v. Ashton, II
Mees. & W. 401, no ground for a new trial. This rule is in force in the
Federal Courts; United States v. Phil. & R. Co., 123 U. S. 113, 114; R. R.
Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545; and a few of the State courts still permit
the judge to comment upon the weight of the evidence. Cook v. Steinert,
69 Conn. 91; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N. Y. 42o; Rowell v Fuller, 59 Vt.
688. But by the weight of authority in the State courts any words from
which the judge's opinion may be inferred, furnish ground for a new trial.
Sanders v. People. 124 Ill. 218; Bird v. State, 1O7 Ind. 156; Com. v. Briant,
142 Mass. 464; State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159.
EQUITY-MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS-INJUNcTIoN.-DUCKTOWN SULPHUR,
COPPER & IRON CO. V. FAIN ET AL., 70 S. W. 813 (TENN.).-The com-
plainant was denied an injunction restraining twenty-one landowners from
bringing separate suits for injuries caused their land by complainant's
sulphur plant. Hield. that equity may not interfere to prevent a multiplicity
of suits merely because there is a community of interest in the question of
law or fact involved.
This decision is directly against Prof. Pomeroy [Porn., Eq. Jur., sec.
268], who, as the only text writer treating the subject fully, has been widely
followed. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Van Cleave, 191 Ill. 410: Barrington
v. Ryan, 88 Mo. App. 85. But the decision is supported by Judge Cooley
in Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406. and by recent cases. Turner v.
Mobile, 33 So. 132; Washington Co. v. Williams, III Fed. 8oi; Tribette v.
R. R. Co., 70 Miss. 182. This last case points out that every case on which
Prof. Pomeroy relied was cognizable in equity on some ground other than
to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Bliss, Code PI., sec. 76.
INSURANcE-LIFE-INSURANcE AGAINST CRIME OR MISCARRIAGE OF Jus-
TrC.-BURT ET AL. V. UNION, ETc., INS. Co., 23 SuP. CT. REP. 139.-Held, a
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policy of life insurance does not insure against legal execution for crime,
even though the insured was in fact innocent.
Any contract which insures against the results of criminal conduct is
against public policy and void. Amicable Soc. v. Bollazd, 4 Bligh N. S. 194.
And for the same reason, where criminal conduct causes death, a policy is
avoided even in absence of express provision to that effect. There is an
implied obligation on the part of insured to do nothing wrongfully to accelerate
the maturity of policy. So where insured's death was caused by an illegal oper-
ation assented to by her, Hatch v. Mutual Ins. Co., i2o Mass. 550, and where
one, while sane, committed suicide, Supreme Comnzandery v. Ainsworth, 71
Ala. 436; Ritter v. Mutual Ins. Co., i69 U. S. I39, the policies were avoided.
But contra, where insured was killed while committing a felony. McDonald
v. Triple Alliance, 57 Mo. App. 87. Upon analogy, it is here held for the
first time, that there can be no legal insurance against miscarriage of justice.
Such contracts are against public policy because they are of a wagering
nature, and tend to encourage litigation.
INSURANcE-AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE LOSS-VADITY.-HARTFORD FIRE
INs. k.o. v. HoN ET AL-, 92 N. W. 746 (NEB.).-Held, an agreement in an
insurance policy to arbitrate the loss is against public policy and void.
Since the decision of Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 8ii (i856), agreements
in policies to arbitrate the loss, as distinguished from agreements to arbitrate
all matters concerning which controversy might arise, have been held valid
by the great weight of authority. Hamilton v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co., 136
U. S. 242; Viney v. Bignold, 2o Q. B. D. 172. But the Nebraska court
held otherwise in Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 5o5, and subsequent cases;
and in the present case emphatically reasserts its position.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-GARNISHMENT-NECESSARY PUBLIC WORK.-
PRINGLE v. GUILD ET AL., I18 FED. 655.-Held, that a municipality could not
be garnisheed to reach money owed by it on a contract for necessary public
work and due during the constiuction.
The statutes generally provide that corporations may be garnisheed, but
as to whether public corporations are included, there is great conflict. Some
States hold that they are. Bray v. Wallingford 20 Conn. 416; Neswark v.
Funk, i5o Ohio St. 462. But the weight of authority is that public corpora-
tions are exempt. Me-nin v. Chicago, 45 I1. 133; Erie v. Knapp, 29 Pa. St.
173.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-ExCHANGE.-KASLACK V. WOLF ET AL., 92
N. W. 514 (NEB.).-Held, that the negotiability of a promissory note is not
destroyed by an agreement to pay with exchange on a point other than that
at which the note is made payable.
The theory upon which this decision rests is that an agreement to pay
exchange is merely incidental and does not affect the negotiability of the
note. Smith v. Kendall, 9 Mich. 241 ; Clark v. Slecen, 6i Kan. 526. A
stronger line of decisions declares that agieement to pay exchange renders
the sum payable uncertain and therefore destroys negotiability. Windsor
Savings Bank v. MacMahon, 38 Fed. 283; Hughett v. Johnson, 28 Fed. 865.
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NOTES-LIMrrATIONS-ACKNOWLEDGMENT or FDET.-CONNCTICUT TRusT
AND SAFE DEPoSIT Co. v. WEADi ET AL., 65 N. E. 261 (N. Y.).-The indorser
of a note, after limitations had run as against him, wrote a letter offering to
buy the note for a small sum. Held, that his liability was not revived
thereby.
To revive a debt after limitations have run against it, an acknowledgment
must be dear, unequivocal, and without conditions. Shepherd v. Thompson,
!22 U. S. 231; Cocks v. Weeks, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 45. A proposal to arbitrate
is not sufficient. Shaw v. Newell, i R. I. 488. Nor is it sufficient though
accompanied by an acknowledgment of some indebtedness. Curtis v. Sacra-
mento, 70 Cal. 412. An offer to compromise is not enough. Bell v. Morrison,
I Pet. (U. S.) 359; Currier v. Lockwood, 4o Conn. 349; Creuse v. Defigan-
iere, IO Bosw. (N. Y.) i. The offer in this case is declared to be a
recognition of a former, but not of an existing, debt.
NoTEs-LIMrTATioNs-DEMAND AFT DATE-HAoN v. DIxoN, 78 N.
Y. Supp. io6.-Plaintiff sued on a note payable "on demand after date."
Held, that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the day
after date. Patterson and Ingraham, J J., dissenting.
Most authorities hold that such a note is not distinguishable from one
payable on demand. It may be sued on, on the day of making, and there-
fore the statute of limitations begins to run on that day. Hitchings v. Ed-
wards, 132 Mass. 338; Fenno v. Gay, 146 Mass. 118; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law 748; 2 Daniel, Neg. Instr., 5th ed., sec. 1215. The words "on demand
after date" are more nearly analogous to such an expression as, "with in-
terest after date."O'Neil v. Magner, 81 Cal. 631; Cousins v. Partridge, 79
Cal. 228. But that in New York such notes are not equivalent to demand
notes seems to be well settled. Bank v. Townsend, 87 N. Y. 8; Crim v. Stark-
weather, 88 N. Y. 339.
NUISANCES-MAINTENANCE-NOTICE TO DEFENDANT.-FINKELSTEIN v.
HUNER, 79 N. Y. SuPP. 334.-In an action for nuisance there was no evidence
that the nuisance existed before the defendant became the owner of the
premises. Held, that proof of notice to the defendant of the existence of
the nuisance was not required. O'Brien and Laughlin, J J., dissenting.
The rule is that no liability will attach until the grantee has received
notice or had knowledge of the existence of the nuisance. R. R. Co. v.
Smith, 64 Fed. 679; fohnson v. Lewds, 13 Conn. 303; Nichols v. Boston, 98
Mass. 39; Wenzlick v. McCotter, 87 N. Y. 122. The opinion claims that
the fact that there was no evidence that the nuisance existed before the
property came into the hands of the defendant made proof of notice un-
necessary. The only citation in support of this is Conhocton Stone Road v.
R. Co., 51 N. Y. 573. The same case is cited in the dissenting opinion, and
would seem rather to support the latter. It was there held that the proof
must show notice to, or knowledge by the defendant to render him liable.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-UNDISCLOSED AGENT-TIME FOE ELtCToN.-TEW
v. WOLFSOHN ET AL., 79 N. Y. SuPr. 286.-Held, that where an agent did not
disclose his agency, the plaintiff in an action on a contract made by the agent
need not elect whether to hold Drincipal or agent until the close of the case.
Van Brunt, P. J., and McLaughlin, J., dissenting.
This decision is confessedly at variance with many dicta, and with some
decisions, notably Tuthill v. Wilson, go N. Y. 423. It is supported by Story,
Agency, sec. 295, quoting 2 Livermore, Agency, sec. 267. But it is considered
to have been rejected in Wharton, Agency, seC. 473, citing Priestley v. Fernie,
: H. & C. Ex. 977. In McLean v. Sexton, 44 N. Y. App. 520, the doctrine
of the present case is distinctly laid down as the New York rule, though
;ivowedly contrary to that in England. See also Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348:
Bank v. Wallis, 84 Hun 376; Beymer v. Bonsall, 78 Pa. St. 298; Maple v.
R. Co., 4o Ohio 313.
